Securing Critical Systems through Continuous User Authentication and Non-repudiation by Schiavone, Enrico
Securing Critical Systems through Continuous User 
Authentication and Non-repudiation  
Enrico Schiavone 
Department of Mathematics and Informatics, University of Florence 
Viale Morgagni 65, 50134, Florence, Italy 
enrico.schiavone@unifi.it 
 
Abstract— Providing a mechanism for authenticating a 
user’s access to resources is very important, especially for 
systems that can be considered critical for the data stored and 
the functionalities offered. In those environments, traditional 
authentication mechanisms can be ineffective to face 
intrusions: they usually verify user’s identity only at login, and 
even repeating this step, frequently asking for passwords or 
PIN would reduce system’s usability. Biometric continuous 
authentication, instead, is emerging as viable alternative 
approach that can guarantee accurate and transparent 
verification for the entire session: the traits can be repeatedly 
acquired avoiding disturbing the user’s activity. Another 
important property that critical systems may need to be 
guaranteed is non-repudiation, which means protection against 
the denial of having used the system or executed some specific 
commands with it. The paper focuses on biometric continuous 
authentication and non-repudiation, and it briefly presents a 
preliminary solution based on a specific case study. This work 
presents the current research direction of the author and 
describes some challenges that the student aims to address in 
the next years.   
Keywords—authenticity; non-repudiation; continuous 
authentication; biometrics; security; 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the last decades, the constant growth and diffusion of 
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) 
contributed to make people’s life easier. Today, users and 
operators can exploit technologies to share confidential data 
from a long distance or to execute critical commands in real-
time. However, the need for security services has gone hand 
in hand with the technological progress.  
Especially when some operation is considered highly 
critical, preventing unauthorized access can avoid 
undesirable consequences or even catastrophes. The system 
in charge to execute an operation has to verify that the 
involved users are really who they claim to be, before giving 
them the permission to accomplish the action. 
Authentication is the process of providing assurance in 
the claimed identity of an entity. The identity verification is 
obtained exploiting a piece of information and/or a process 
called authentication factor that belongs to one of the 
following categories: knowledge (e.g. password, PIN); 
possession (e.g. passport, private key); inherence (biometric 
characteristics, physiological or behavioral, e.g. fingerprint 
or keystroke).  
Traditionally this verification is based on pairs of 
username and password and performed as a single-
occurrence process, only at login phase. No checks are 
executed during sessions, which are terminated by an 
explicit logout or expire after an idle activity period of the 
user. Instead, if the operation covers a long period, it may be 
necessary to repeat the authentication procedure; however, 
asking for passwords and secrets several times requires 
users’ active participation, and it may disturb their main 
activity. In order to design an effective continuous 
authentication mechanism for critical systems, together with 
security, also usability has to be taken into account. 
To prevent unauthorized access of ICT systems, 
solutions based on biometric continuous authentication have 
been studied in literature. They modify user identity 
verification from a single-occurrence to a continuous 
process [1], [2]. To enhance security, authentication can also 
exploit multiple traits, being multimodal; in fact it has been 
verified that using various biometric traits, properly 
combined, can improve the performance of the identity 
verification process. In addition, with appropriate sensors, 
some biometric traits can be acquired transparently. 
 However, most of the existing solutions suffer from 
high computational overhead or their usability has not been 
adequately substantiated. Our goal is to design a multi-
biometric continuous authentication system that is usable, 
incurs in little system overhead and permits to easily 
manage the trade-off between security and usability through 
configuration parameters. 
Besides authentication, being able to demonstrate user 
involvement in the usage of a system or application can also 
be useful. In fact, when a dispute arises or a disaster happens 
people may try to deny their involvement and to repudiate 
their behavior.  
Repudiation can be defined as the denial of having 
participated in all or part of an action by one of the entities 
involved. Consequently non-repudiation is the ability to 
protect against denial by one of the entities involved in an 
action of having participated in all or part the action.  
A non-repudiation mechanism should guarantee the 
establishment of the facts even in front of a court of law. 
Therefore, a non-repudiation service can be useful both as a 
mean to obtain accountability as well as a deterrent for 
deliberate misbehaviors.  
This paper presents the research plan of a second year 
Ph.D. student and it follows [13] and [14]. The objective of 
the research direction identified is to study, define, and 
possibly test, mechanisms that can offer authentication and 
non-repudiation, with the aim to provide trustworthy 
security services for ICT systems.  
  The present work is focused on biometric continuous 
authentication and describes a case study regarding control 
room workstations, in which traditional mechanisms -i.e. 
password-based authentication- are not sufficient for the 
expected requirements. In addition, it addresses the issue of 
repudiation and study scenarios, and possible solutions in 
which a biometric-based non-repudiation service can help 
solving disputes between entities.  
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II presents our 
contribution in providing continuous authentication, briefly 
describing the approach we followed, some results regarding 
its usability and the ongoing work related to risk assessment; 
Section III concentrates on non-repudiation, its connection 
with biometrics and introduces some scenarios.  
 
II. BIOMETRIC CONTINUOUS AUTHENTICATION OF CONTROL 
ROOM OPERATORS 
A. Context and Requirements 
Control room operators are a category of users that can 
access potentially sensitive information to issue critical 
commands for the entire working session. They are also 
directly responsible for such commands and for the data 
accessed, modified and deleted.  
For instance, transportation (e.g. airways, railways), 
electric power generation, military or aerospace operations 
are some contexts in which control rooms are often adopted. 
Operators are in charge of analyzing and interpreting 
situations that describe the current status of events and 
activities. They are also able to command intervention teams 
on field, or to dispatch instructions in a target area. It is 
required to protect the control rooms and their workstations 
from unauthorized people, both intruders and insiders, that 
may want to acquire privacy-sensitive data, disrupt the 
operations, disseminate false information, or simply commit 
errors which will be ascribed to the operator in charge of the 
workstation.  
Consequently, in order to protect the workstations, we 
need to guarantee authenticity and non-repudiation of the 
commands/functions executed, meaning that the identity of 
the worker which sends the commands from a workspace 
should be properly verified and they cannot deny that action.  
In addition, the workspace should be usable for the 
legitimate worker: the security mechanism should not 
disturb or excessively slow down the working activity of the 
operator. For that reason the verification process should be 
transparent. 
B. The Proposed Continuous Authentication Protocol 
To comply with the above requirements we defined a 
client-server multimodal continuous authentication protocol 
(for further details on requirements please refer to [3]). The 
overall architecture of the biometric system is composed of 
the operator workstation and the connected sensors required 
for acquiring the biometric data. It is based on three 
biometric subsystems, for face recognition, fingerprint 
recognition and keystroke recognition.  
The protocol is shown in the sequence diagram of Fig. 1. 
and is divided in two phases: the initial phase and the 
maintenance phase. 
Initial phase. It is composed of the following steps: 
− The user logs in with a strong authentication or a 
successful biometric verification executed with all the 
three subsystems in a short time interval. 
− Biometric data is acquired by the workstation and 
transmitted to the authentication server.  
− The authentication server matches the operator’s 
templates with the traits stored in a database and 
verifies his/her identity.  
− In case of successful verification, the Critical System 
establishes a session and allows all restricted 
functions expected for the operator's role.  
− The authentication server computes and updates a 
trust level that decreases as time passes; the session 
expires when such level becomes lower than a 
threshold.  
Maintenance phase.  
− The authentication server waits for fresh biometric 
data, from any of the three subsystems.  
− When new biometric data is available, the 
authentication server verifies the identity claimed by 
the operator and, depending on the matching results 
of each subsystem, updates the trust level. 
− When the trust level is close to the threshold, the 
authentication server may send a notification to the 
operator, to signal that the session will expire soon. 
− When the trust level is below the threshold, the 
Critical System disables the restricted functions, 
Fig. 1 Sequence Diagram of the Protocol 
which will be available again only when the operator  
restarts from the initial phase.  
No active participation of the operator is necessary, 
which only needs to use the mouse – that should incorporate 
a fingerprint scanner at the place where users would 
normally place their thumb-, a keyboard, or to be positioned 
in front of a webcam.  
More details about the protocol, the algorithm for trust 
level computation the prototype realized and the software 
implemented can be found in [3]. 
C. Usability and Risk Assessment  
To investigate the usability of the system, we are 
conducting an experiment (which in part is a replication of 
[10]) involving a wide group of participants, asking them to 
complete four tasks on a workstation provided with our 
continuous authentication application running in 
background. First, we want to measure the effectiveness of 
our solution, calculating the FAR (False Acceptance Rate), 
and the FRR (False Rejection Rate) for each of the 
biometric subsystem, and for the main biometric continuous 
authentication system. 
Then, we are going to measure the efficiency of the 
system, tracking the time interval between the initial 
authentication and any unexpected termination (meaning 
that the trust level has fallen below the threshold). Similarly, 
we are interested in the time necessary to the authentication 
system to reject an impostor. The user satisfaction will be 
measured with a questionnaire. In addition to usability 
testing, we want to clarify if the overhead introduced by the 
continuous authentication system can slow down the 
workstation and consequently increase the users’ required 
effort. Another main goal is to perform the specified 
measurements with different parameters configuration, e.g. 
varying the trust threshold (the minimum trust level allowed 
to remain authenticated).  
Preliminary results are in [11]. They show that the 
system appears to be secure and usable, and there is every 
chance to increase its usability integrating three highly 
accurate recognition algorithms. In fact, 75% of the users 
completed the tests without unexpected expirations, and this 
result is interesting if compared with the previous studies. 
As expected, modifying parameters we were able to obtain a 
highly usable configuration, with which the users remained 
authenticated for the whole duration of the session. In terms 
of resources utilization, Biometric Continuous 
Authentication System did not have any significant impact 
on task performance, and its overhead was negligible.  
We are also conducting a NIST-compliant qualitative 
risk assessment for the biometric continuous authentication 
protocol [15]. The activity focuses on both threats related to 
transmission and specific for the biometric system level. 
The goal is to establish its strengths, weaknesses and 
consequently understand the countermeasures needed in 
order to improve the security of our authentication solution.  
The proposed protocol addressed the problem of non-
repudiation exploiting the biometric nature of the 
credentials, which are supposed to provide it inherently. 
However, this is still under discussion, as described in 
Section IV; for this reason we are working on improvements 
that should fully guarantee non-repudiation. 
III. NON-REPUDIATION 
Explanatory tests show that with our solution for 
continuous authentication, the authenticity of control room 
operators is guaranteed. However, although with this 
solution it appears very hard for the user to deny having 
accessed the system, the deniability is related to error rates: 
is an intruder still able to repudiate actions?  
 Trying to directly address this problem, we aim to 
discuss if a continuous authentication mechanism, based on 
the usage of biometric traits, provides sufficient undeniable 
evidence of user’s participation in an action. 
A. Biometrics Can Guarantee Non-Repudiation? 
According to the author of [12], unlike passwords and 
tokens, biometrics - because of their strong binding to 
specific persons- is the only authentication factor capable of 
guaranteeing that authentication cannot subsequently be 
refused by a user.  
In [4] the author claims that for authentication mechanisms, 
non-repudiation depends on: (i) The ability of the 
authentication mechanism to discriminate between 
individuals; (ii) The strength of binding between the 
authentication data and the individual in question; (iii) 
Technical and procedural vulnerabilities that could 
undermine the intrinsic strength of the binding; (iv) 
Informed consent of the individual at the time the 
authentication is given.  
In addition, the discrimination capabilities of biometrics 
depend on the technology used and on other application-
related factors, that are quantified in terms of error rates 
(FAR and FRR) [4]. Despite biometric traits are sometimes 
presented in the computer security literature as an 
authentication factor that may solve the repudiation problem 
[12], [4], other works like [5], [6] draw completely different 
conclusions. Analyzing the state of the art, we can state that 
the answers to this question are contradictory.  
However, the situation changes if biometric 
authentication is coupled with another security mechanism 
like digital signature, which is commonly considered as the 
standard approach to achieve non-repudiation.  In fact, 
public key infrastructure, or PKI, and biometrics can well 
complement each other in many security applications [7]. 
Apart from biometrics, our opinion is that a non-
repudiation service should be capable of:  
- Reliably (and if necessary continuously) verifying the 
user’s identity.  In other words, we think that non-
repudiation is impossible without authentication. 
- Generating an undeniable and unforgeable evidence of 
the action and bind it with the user’s identity. 
B. Further Non-repudiation Scenarios  
There are many actions that an individual or an entity 
may want to deny, e.g. for economic reasons, to fraud 
someone or to hide a malpractice. The most studied non-
repudiation protocols in the state of the art regard the 
transactions and exchange of messages scenario [8], [9].  
Usually a basic transaction is defined as the transferring 
of a message M from user A to user B, and the following are 
the typical disputes that may arise: 
− A claims that it has sent M to B, while B denies 
having received it; 
− B claims that it received M from A, while A denies 
sending it; and 
− A claims that it sent M before a deadline T, while B 
denies receiving it before T. 
Transactions, especially in the e-commerce field, are 
often denied by consumers. According to The New York 
Times, 0.05% of MasterCard transactions worldwide are 
subjects of disputes, that probably means around 15 million 
questionable charges per year. Analysts, in general, estimate 
that 20% of disputes involve fraud. Providing a non-
repudiation service for this scenario and solving those 
disputes, would probably make issuers save a lot of money. 
Non-repudiation services can cover other kind of actions, 
not only transactions.  In fact, there are many scenarios in 
the field of information exchange that may be better 
protected with proper authentication and non-repudiation 
services. Changing the mean of communication, the nature 
of exchanged data or the kind of information flow (i.e. one-
time occurrence or continuous), we can distinguish several 
issues to address and related solutions. For instance, e-mails, 
instant messaging, VoIP communications or accessing files 
stored in a private area on a server are some of the possible 
scenarios. In general, what the service should generate is 
undeniable evidence that can be used if a dispute arises. 
Evidence is a crucial object, and sometimes has to be 
processed by a Trusted Third Party (TTP) [8]. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
Security is a fundamental property in the ICT field, 
especially for critical systems and applications in which 
confidential data are managed and where unauthorized 
accesses and behaviors can cause undesirable consequences 
or even catastrophes. In this context, authentication and 
non-repudiation are common requirements. The aim of our 
research is to study approaches to guarantee them. First, we 
are planning to integrate an existing biometric continuous 
authentication mechanism [2] with a non-repudiation service 
and our solution will probably combine biometric 
continuous authentication with digital signature.  
Finally, another ongoing activity is investigating if 
biometrics-based solutions permit to obtain irrefutable 
evidence of user identity: for different scenarios we will 
study which biometric trait –single or combined- can be 
appropriate, also considering the error rates that may be 
admissible, the technological or environmental limitations 
and the user acceptability. A strategy can be searching a set 
of the most accurate biometric verification algorithms in 
literature (e.g. exploiting initiatives like [16]), and trying to 
evaluate the probability of successful non-repudiation for a 
user of a continuous authentication system based on a 
combination of those algorithms. 
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